Formerly /u/Zagorath on the alien site.

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Joined 3 years ago
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Cake day: June 15th, 2023

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  • Actually something just occurred to me. Because my system, unlike the one from the Stack Exchange link or the one described elsewhere in the thread using an ID card, relies on a per-site untraceable request to the government, the government would be able to detect if one user is making a suspicious number of requests. It’s reasonable for one person to make tens of requests, maybe even low hundreds over the course of a lifetime. It’s not reasonable to be making hundreds or more in a day. They wouldn’t know which sites are being accessed with it, or even what accounts on those sites. But they could set rate limits to prevent one person creating too many accounts for others, and potentially threaten legal action against them for doing so.

    That threat of legal action is part of the same thing that prevents children from being able to go up to a random adult, handing them a $50 note, and asking for $20 worth of alcohol in exchange. You’re not going to be able to prevent it on a smaller scale, but you can definitely prevent a small handful of people being able to age verify on behalf of thousands of children.

    An additional protection could be added depending on how the age verification works. If she verification is “upload a scan of your photo ID”, then yeah, mass verification becomes possible. But if each verification requires you to hold up your photo ID next to your face, speak a specific phrase aloud (with automated lip reading attempting a rough lip flap match), nod your head, write a specific phrase on a piece of paper, and more, all in randomised orders, it becomes a much bigger burden for someone to provide for others.

    I’m certainly not advocating this. The level of burden for legitimate users would be too high to consider it reasonable. But it would be possible. Something like this has been used in the past for things like EV code signing certificates, where a larger burden is relatively more reasonable.



  • It would also reveal to the government that the user was accessing 18+ content

    Yes, I did mention that. Although ironically, Australia’s social media minimum age law, and other similar laws being considered around the world, would actually increase privacy in this respect. The government could have separate keys for each age of legal significance (16 and 18, in Australia) and sign with the appropriate one (either the highest the user meets, or all the user meets—the latter would give the site less information about the user’s and).

    I don’t believe it is technically possible to get around the example you shared there. Even in the real world, it’s not dissimilar to a child asking an adult to buy alcohol for them.



  • Here’s one good answer: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/96283

    It has the downside of requiring a physical device like a passport or some specific trusted long-running locally-kept identity store held by the user. But it’s otherwise very good.

    Another option does not require anything extra be kept by the user, but does slightly compromise privacy. The Government will not be able to track each time the user tries to access age-gated content, or even know what sources of age-gated content are being accessed, but they will know how many different sites the user has requested access to. It works like this:

    1. The user creates or logs in to an account on the age-gated site.
    2. The site creates a token T that can uniquely identify that user.
    3. That token is then blinded B(T). Nobody who receives B(T) can learn anything about the user.
    4. The user takes the token to the government age verification service (AVS).
    5. The user presents the AVS with B(T) and whatever evidence is needed to verify age.
    6. The AVS checks if the person should be verified. If not, we can end the flow here. If so, move on.
    7. The AVS signs the blinded token using a trusted AVS certificate, S(B(T)) and returns it to the user.
    8. The user returns the token to the site.
    9. The site unblinds the token and obtains S(T). This allows them to see that it is the same token T representing the user, and to know that it was signed by the AVS, indicating that the user is of age.
    10. The site marks in their database that the user has been age verified. On future visits to that site, the user can just log in as normal, no need to re-verify.

    All of the moving around of the token can be automated by the browser/app, if it’s designed to be able to do that. Unfortunately a typical OAuth-style redirect system probably would not work (someone with more knowledge please correct me), because it would expose to the AVS what site the token is being generated for. So the behaviour would need to be created bespoke. Or a user could have a file downloaded and be asked to share it manually.

    There’s also a potential exposure of information due to timing. If site X has a user begin the age verification flow at 8:01, and the AVS receives a request at 8:02, and the site receives a return response with a signed token at 8:05, then the government can, with a subpoena (or the consent of site X) work out that the user who started it at 8:01 and return at 8:05 is probably the same person who started verifying themselves at 8:02. Or at least narrow it down considerably. Making the redirect process manual would give the user the option to delay that, if they wanted even more privacy.

    The site would probably want to store the unblinded, signed token, as long-term proof that they have indeed verified the user’s age with the AVS. A subsequent subpoena would not give the Government any information they could not have obtained from a subpoena in an un-age-verified system, assuming the token does not include a timestamp.







  • There is some merit to the idea in some highly competitive sports that trans women may retain some biological advantage over cis women.

    However, the “protect women’s sports” crowd isn’t interested in having a good faith discussion about it. For starters, they’ll cry against even the idea of preteen trans girls playing with cis girls. Or against trans women in a social women’s sport club. Outside of elite sports, the argument is literally completely irrelevant because so many other factors are far, far more significant. When you have a league consisting of people who have been playing casually for a year or two in addition to people who were only a few spots away from going pro, the difference between the genders is an irrelevancy.

    But there have also been studies that say the biological advantage is overstated. One study showed that 2 years after starting HRT, trans women retained none of the advantage they started with in push ups or sit ups, and that the advantage in a middle distance run halved. The study didn’t say, but I’d hypothesise that after 5 years that, too, would be gone.

    So at the elite levels, it’s fair to say that each sport should be making its own decision based on the types of fitness and skills involved. And those decisions should be based on the weight of evidence, not—as is usually the case today—on the vibes or because of political lobbying. Some restrictions, especially pre-hormonal transition and shortly after, are likely warranted in many cases. Longer-term restrictions are less defensible.

    And all of this assumes someone who went through a normal male puberty. It says nothing of the fact that the same crowd arguing against trans people in sport are the ones arguing against puberty blockers and allowing children to make decisions for themselves with the aid of their parents and doctors, without government intervening. If that were allowed, many of those biological advantages never would have been able to develop in the first place.