I’m pulling the “twitter is a microblog” rule even though twitter is pretty mega now, hope that’s ok.

  • SkaveRat@discuss.tchncs.de
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    3
    arrow-down
    1
    ·
    10 days ago

    (The halting problem and Godel’s incompleteness and Traski’s undefinability theorems all seem to suggest that analog, not digital computing is responsible for consciousness.)

    I hear that argument from time to time, and I never found a source for it. I want to understand the original claim. Because it doesn’t make any sense when people bring it up. because both theorems do not have anything to do with the areas it’s applied to. I understand why people think it does, but it just doesn’t

    • yeahiknow3@lemmy.dbzer0.com
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      2
      ·
      9 days ago

      The simplest way to understand this problem is as follows.

      1. Analog computation is not digitally reducible. (Brains are analog computers.)

      2. Turing’s infamous Halting Problem.

      I can write more about this and point you to more technical discussions if you want.

      • SkaveRat@discuss.tchncs.de
        link
        fedilink
        English
        arrow-up
        1
        ·
        8 days ago

        I really don’t see what either gödels or turnings theorems have to do with it

        All they (basically) tell you is that you can’t tell if a computation will guarantee to halt , and that you can’t proof everything with math

        It’s not excluding consciousness on a digital basis. Unless you already prerequisite some special property of consciousness to begin with

        • yeahiknow3@lemmy.dbzer0.com
          link
          fedilink
          English
          arrow-up
          1
          ·
          8 days ago

          You’re misunderstanding the implications of both the halting problem and Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.

          What Turing and Gödel independently proved is that a human observer can (theoretically) always have insights about mathematics and programming that are incomputable. That is, you cannot program or axiomatize or formalize or digitize everything that a mind can do. Period.

          Analog computers are sufficiently different from digital systems to potentially emulate brain activity. But digital (discrete) methods are probably too constrained.

          • SkaveRat@discuss.tchncs.de
            link
            fedilink
            English
            arrow-up
            1
            ·
            8 days ago

            What Turing and Gödel independently proved is that a human observer can (theoretically) always have insights about mathematics and programming that are incomputable. That is, you cannot program or axiomatize or formalize or digitize everything that a mind can do. Period.

            that is not what either of them proved. like… at all

            • yeahiknow3@lemmy.dbzer0.com
              link
              fedilink
              English
              arrow-up
              1
              ·
              edit-2
              6 days ago

              You will find what I said in any philosophy of mathematics textbook dealing with the subject. In fact, I am paraphrasing the Oxford logician Joel David Hamkins.

              You’re welcome to also read Shapiro’s famous paper for a rephrasing. These results have been well understood for half a century, although because the implications are ultimately metaphysical and not mathematical, we can’t be sure of the wider consequences, if any.

              • SkaveRat@discuss.tchncs.de
                link
                fedilink
                English
                arrow-up
                1
                ·
                8 days ago

                ah, now we’re getting somewhere.

                Going through some of the related paper abstracts, including speculative comments by Gödel: this is pure philosophy. Nothing that is set in stone. Which now points me back to my initial statement, where we can discuss all we want, but in the end it’s philosophy. Not “hard” (“provable”) science

                • yeahiknow3@lemmy.dbzer0.com
                  link
                  fedilink
                  English
                  arrow-up
                  1
                  ·
                  edit-2
                  8 days ago

                  Here is what we know for sure:

                  There can be no enumerable list of axioms for the true statements of mathematics. No computational procedure could exist to determine whether propositions are valid, provable, or even equivalent. And no matter how you formulate the number-theoretic axioms, a mathematician would always have insights (for instance, about whether a Diophantine equation has a solution) that are both clearly “true” and obviously unprovable. This holds true for all digital systems.

                  Here is what we don’t know for sure:

                  The metaphysical implications.

                  Your distinction between science and philosophy is incorrect. Science is inductive and abductive. It can’t “prove” things. It’s not deductive. Mathematics and philosophy can prove things.

                  Philosophy also determines the formal systems we use as a basis of reasoning, for instance, in science.

                  • SkaveRat@discuss.tchncs.de
                    link
                    fedilink
                    English
                    arrow-up
                    1
                    arrow-down
                    1
                    ·
                    edit-2
                    8 days ago

                    Mathematics and logic

                    agreed

                    and philosophy

                    and here I disagree

                    Edit: aww, baby doesn’t like the philosophy of being disagreed with and blocked me. Should probably go back to kindergarten instead of college